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RULE 10b-5 AND THE CONTROL PREMIUM: DUTIES OF
DISCLOSURE AND INVITATION
I. Ferraioli v. Cantarl
In February, 1965, Denison Mines Ltd. was the controlling shareholder of
General Baking Company. Denison owned 553,000 shares, one-third of all the
General Baking stock, and was able to elect the General Baking president and
several of its directors. The Goldfield Corporation was interested in purchasing
a controlling interest in General Baking and negotiations to this effect were con-
ducted with Denison between February 1 and May 13, 1965. The presidents of
Denison and Goldfield agreed upon a tentative price of $12.50 per share, al-
though the market price at the time was $9.00 per share. The $3.50 difference
was a premium paid for contro1. 2 On May 10, Goldfield's board of directors
approved the purchase of up to 665,000 shares from Denison at the $12.50 price.
Between May 10 and May 13, the final terms were worked out and, on May
13, Denison sold 553,900 shares of General Baking stock to Goldfield at
$12.50 per share, subject to the approval of Denison's board of directors. On
the same day, "associates" 3 of Denison who owned General Baking stock
sold 75,100 shares to Goldfield at the $12.50 price. The associates' shares
brought the total of Goldfield's purchase to 629,000 shares. The approval of
Denison's board of directors was given on May 17, and on that date a public
announcement was made of the sale.
Anthony Ferraioli, the plaintiff, had owned 400 shares of General
Baking stock which he sold on the open market on May 10 at $8 /3 per
share. Ferraioli brought an action under Section 10(b) 4
 and Rule 10b-5 5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on behalf of himself and similarly
situated former General Baking stockholders who sold their stock between
February 1 and May 17. The plaintiffs alleged that the payment by Goldfield
of a premium over market price for the shares purchased from Denison and
its "associates" worked a fraud on the plaintiffs because they were not told
of the negotiations in progress between Denison and Goldfield and were not
1 281 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2 The court does not provide any basis for its assertion of this fact. The plaintiff
attributes the $3.50 payment over the $9.00 market price as consideration for the transfer
of control. Brief for Plaintiff at 4, Ferraioli v. Cantor, 281 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
3 The plaintiff has not been able to determine exactly who the "associates" were,
since the sale was made through a trust company. Id. at 5-6.
4 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1968) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
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offered an opportunity to participate in the sale of General Baking stock at
a premium. The plaintiffs alleged that since Denison made it possible for
certain "associates" to participate in the sale of stock at a premium, all
minority General Baking stockholders should have been offered the same
opportunity.6
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was denied in a memorandum
decision. The defendants then moved for reargument of their summary judg-
ment motion, or, in the alternative, for a court order allowing them to appeal
directly to the court of appeals. These motions were likewise denied. The court.
held that a claim is stated under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 either where a
controlling shareholder discloses to some, but not to all, minority shareholders,
the existence of a purchaser's offer to pay a premium for a certain number of
shares in addition to the controlling shares; or, where the controlling share-
holder invites some, but not all, minority shareholders to participate in a sale
of stock at a premium.
A summary judgment decision is not generally rendered on the complete
facts of the case since it occurs before a trial on the merits.? The court, in
response to a summary judgment motion, takes the allegations of the plain-
tiff as fact, and resolves reasonable uncertainties in favor of the plaintiffs
A denial of the motion gives notice of the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact.° The opinion in Ferraioli does not make clear which allegations
of fact were relied upon in the determination that a claim may be stated under
106-5, nor does it make clear the precise nature of the 10b-5 claim which
might be stated.
Because of the vagueness of the court's opinion, Ferraioli is susceptible
of two interpretations. First, the court may simply have seen Ferraioli as
another case where "insiders'l° and "tippees" 1 1 traded on material informa-
tion without proper disclosure. The court may have felt that the controlling
shareholder informed certain associates that a purchaser was willing to pay
a premium for more shares of stock than the controlling stockholder
owned, and then, that the associates bought stock from the plaintiffs in the
open market without disclosure of the availability of the premium. This
interpretation of the opinion finds some support in the court's remark that
it was not apparent under what circumstances the associates purchased their
stock, or whether the controlling shareholder or any of his associates pur-
chased stock in the open market with knowledge of the Goldfield offer. 12
6 Although the court states that the plaintiffs were seeking the premium on the
entire 629,000 shares, the plaintiff's brief suggests that the recovery sought was only
a "portion" of the premium. Brief for Plaintiff at 1-2, Ferraioli v. Cantor, 281 F. Supp.
354 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
8 See Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp, 321 U.S. 620, 628-29 (1944).
9 See F. James, Civil Procedure 231 (1965).
10 An "insider" is a person who has access to material information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone. Ross
v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
11 A "tippee" is a person who is given information in breach of trust by an insider
and is subject to the same duties as an insider. Id. at 410.
12 281 F. Supp. at 358.
744
THE CONTROL PREMIUM AND DUTIES OF DISCLOSURE
If the court felt that the plaintiffs could establish these facts at trial, it was
correct in holding that a claim is stated under 10b-5. This is a common type of
10b-5 action, and is not particularly noteworthy."
However, a second interpretation is possible. Ferraioli may have held
that disclosure by the controlling Stockholder to only a few of the minority
stockholders that a premium was available for a certain number of shares
in addition to the controlling shares, or that invitation of only some of the
minority stockholders to join in such a premium, is a violation of 10b-5,
even if none of the defendants had first augmented their holdings by buying
shares• from uninformed, uninvited minority shareholders. Although the
opinion in Ferraioli is not entirely clear, the tenor of the decision as a whole
supports this second, novel interpretation." For the purposes of this comment,
it shall be assumed that the second interpretation was intended by the court.
The validity of that holding will then be analyzed in terms of the proper
statement of a Rule 101)-5 claim. Since this interpretation reveals that two
separate violations of 10b-5 may have occurred, a breach of a duty to dis-
close and breach of a duty to invite, this comment will examine each of these
alleged violations separately and then determine the relationship between
them.
II. THE DUTY To DISCLOSE
The court found a violation of 10b-5 where a controlling stockholder,
after being informed by the purchaser that he is willing to pay a premium for
shares in excess of those owned by the controlling shareholder, gives this in-
formation to certain associates and thereby enables them to take advantage of
the premium in the sale of their individual shares of stock. Ferraioli apparently
requires that the controlling shareholder disclose the availability of a premium
to all minority shareholders and not just to those chosen by the controlling
shareholder.
Materiality or significance of the undisclosed information is a critical
issue in the determination whether 10b-5 imposes a duty of disclosure."
"Fraud" and "deceit" require that a misrepresentation or non-disclosure
relate to facts which are important to the plaintiff, as a reasonable man,
rather than to merely collateral matters." The material fact in the Ferraioli
case is the availability of the premium for a certain number of shares in
addition to the controlling shares. The plaintiff alleged, in effect, that if the
availability of the premium had been disclosed to him, he would have taken
advantage of the information by attempting to sell his stock at the premium.
13 See, e.g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
14 For example, the court states:
[Ilf Denison used material undisclosed information for its benefit or for the
benefit of its "associates" or "tippees," plaintiff would be entitled to seek recovery
under Section 10(b) and Rule 106-5.
281 F. Stipp. at 356. The court further states:
[It is] sufficient to hold here that where a control stockholder invites some but
not other stockholders to participate m the sale, a clairit may be stated.
Id. at 357.
15 See 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1431 (2d ed. 1961).
16
 Id. See also W. Prosser, Handbook of the LaW of Tarts 734 (3d ed. 1964).
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The availability of the premium meets the usual test for materiality. in
general, the materiality of undisclosed facts turns on whether a plaintiff
would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant
had disclosed those facts to him." In Ferraioli, the plaintiffs alleged that they
would not have sold their stock at the market price if they had been told
about the premium. Even if it could be proven conclusively that the plain-
tiffs would never have taken part in the premium, even with full disclosure,
the availability of the premium would still be a material fact. Knowledge
that a premium sale was taking place would have influenced the plaintiffs to
act differently.
A reasonable investor would certainly be influenced to act differently if
he knew that a $3.50 premium was available to certain minority shareholders.
If the controlling shareholder told the plaintiffs that a premium was available
for a certain number of shares above the controlling shares, but at the same
time told them that he had already determined which of the minority stock-
holders would be allowed to join in such a premium, a reasonable investor's
judgment could still be affected. The investor could go to the controlling stock-
holder and ask to be allowed to join in the premium, or could go directly to
the purchaser and offer his additional shares for premium sale. If both these
efforts were to fail, an investor might be alerted to the fact that state fiduciary
law was' being violated.' 8 Thus, even if there is no apparent chance for the
minority shareholder to join in the premium sale when disclosure is made,
the availability of the premium is still material to him since he could reason-
ably decide to hold his shares and to approach either the controlling share-
holder or the purchaser, or to pursue a remedy under state fiduciary law.
The establishment of a material fact is only one element of a lOb-5 claim.
Before a plaintiff can recover, he must show that he stood in a relationship
with the defendant which was within the protection of Rule 10b-5. 19 Even
though the opinion in Ferraioli does not deal specifically with the relationship
between the plaintiffs and defendants, this aspect of the case may be the most
significant feature of the decision. The plaintiffs in Ferraioli sold their stock
on the market at the time when the defendants were negotiating for the sale
of stock at a premium. The defendants did not trade on the market; they
traded among themselves. Thus, there were two distinct transactions: the
11
 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir, 1965).
18 It cannot be established conclusively under the limited facts presented in Ferraioli
whether any state fiduciary law has been violated. It is possible that the "associates"
were directors and, if so, they may have stood in a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiffs.
See H. Henn, Handbook of the Law of Corporations 377-80 (1961). If the "associates"
were directors, the plaintiffs may have an action based on the fact that directors must
exercise
unbiased judgment in the best interests of the corporation as a whole. Any
attempt . . to favor one intracorporate group to the detriment of another
breaches such [fiduciary] duties to the corporation.
Id. at 380. It is also possible that the plaintiffs could bring an action against the
controlling shareholder for breach of fiduciary duties even if no directors were in fact
involved, since the controlling shareholder may have stood in a fiduciary relationship
to the plaintiffs. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 15, at 1450. Cf. W. Fletcher, Private Corpora-
tions § 5811 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1961).
11)
 Cf. Fisher v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 130, 190-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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plaintiffs sold stock to third parties on the open market, and the defendants
bought and sold stock among themselves.
Although the courts have done away with a requirement of privity in
a 106-5 case," the duty to disclose is usually limited to the situation where
the plaintiffs and defendants dealt with each other, at least indirectly.21
This requirement of some type of dealing between the plaintiffs and defen-
dants probably results from the fact that the vast majority of the cases
brought under 10b-5 have been instituted by persons who have been "de-
frauded" either in direct dealings with the defendant, 22 or in a more indirect
situation where some connecting element is still present. 23 There have been
very few cases where a plaintiff, who did not deal with the defendant in any
ordinary manner, has brought an action under 10b-5. Ferraioli, then, is one of
these rare cases.
Although there is no case with a relationship aspect similar to that in
Ferraioli, there is at least one case providing some analogy. In McManus
v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co.,24 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants,
former directors and majority stockholders, violated 10b-5 by selling their
holdings at a large premium without disclosing this information to the
plaintiffs or offering the plaintiffs an opportunity to participate. The plain-
tiffs alleged also that the defendants made false and misleading statements
with regard to the transaction. The defendants moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the complaint on its face revealed no 10b-5 cause of action
because, inter alia, none of the plaintiffs had been a party to the defendants'
stock transactions, either as purchasers or sellers. The plaintiffs in this case
were apparently still stockholders. The court denied the defendants' motion
to dismiss, thereby implying that the relationship between the plaintiffs and
the defendants was adequate even though the plaintiffs had not dealt with
the defendants even indirectly.
In 1952, however, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.25 was decided on
similar facts. In that case, the court held that a 10b-5 plaintiff must be either
a defrauded purchaser or seller of securities in order to maintain an action.
The court in Birnbaum felt that 10b-3 was aimed "solely at that type of mis-
representation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or pur-
chase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate
affairs...."
Rule 10b-S appears, if anything, to militate forcefully against a doctrine
241 Although it was once felt that at least "a semblance of privity" was necessary
to maintain an action under 10b-5, see Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), no requirement of privity presently exists. See
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 249 (6th Cir. 1962).
21 Cf. A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud—SEC Rule 10b-5 8.5 (1968).
22 See, e.g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
23 See, e.g., Fisher v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
24 Civil No. 8015 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1948), reported in 5 SEC Judicial Decisions
810 (1948).
211 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). Birnbaum was a derivative action.
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as limiting as that enunciated in Birnbaurn. 26
 Even the court which decided
Birnbaum now questions whether it is a viable decision. 27 If the defendants'
conduct were fraudulent, the application of Rule 10b-5 to situations like that
presented in Birnbaum would accord with the broad general purpose of in-
vestor protection underlying securities legislation. 28 At any rate Ferraioli can
be distinguished from both McManus and Birnbaum, because in Ferraioli the
plaintiffs were sellers, even though they did not sell to the defendants. It would
seem that, if a plaintiff who neither bought nor sold securities may be protected
by 10b-5, a plaintiff who has sold should certainly be protected.
Rule 10b-5 is broad enough to encompass the relationship between the
plaintiffs and defendants in Ferraioli. If the plaintiffs were "defrauded" in
the sense that the defendants withheld material information from the plain-
tiffs, and subsequently bought and sold on the basis of this material informa-
tion, then the plaintiffs would bear the requisite relationship to the defendants
because they were "defrauded" by "any person," "directly or indirectly,"
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."29 The wording of
Rule 10b-5 is extremely broad. The congressional purpose of section 10(b)
favors broad application of the Rule itself. 3° Congress sought to assure an
open and free market by complete disclosure of all material facts. "No in-
vestor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges
without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of
the securities he buys or sells."31
One recent major case provides additional support for the sufficiency of
the relationship between the parties in Ferraioli. In SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.,32
 the court, discussing the withholding of material information,
felt that where
a corporate purpose is . .. served by withholding the news of a
material fact, those persons who are thus quite properly true to
their corporate trust must not during the period of non-disclosure
deal personally in the corporation's securities or give to outsiders
confidential information not generally available to all the corpora-
tions' [sic] stockholders and to the public at large. 33
The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur felt that the "investing public" should be
effectively informed of material information before insider trading is begun.'"
The defendants in Ferraioli did not buy or sell securities on the open
26 Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5,
54 Va. L. Rev. 268, 275 (1968).
27 See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Vine v. Bene-
ficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1967); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d
393 (2d Cir. 1967).
28 Note, Civil Liability under Rule X-10b-5, 42 Va. L. Rev. 537, 570-71 (1956).
20 See note 5 supra.
3° Congress instructed the SEC to formulate a rule which would prohibit the use
of "manipulative and deceptive" devices. See Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(13) (1964).
31
 H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
32 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
33
 Id. at 850 n.12.
a4
 Id. at 849.
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market, and, under early interpretations of 1011,5, this fact might have been a
barrier to a plaintiff who wished to maintain a 10b-5 claim.35 However, there„.
is no express language in the statute or the Rule which limits their scope to
direct dealing in an organized market. Moreover, there are positive indications
in the Exchange Act and in its legislative history which suggest that the
scope of the statute extends to all transactions in securities, unless the con-
trary appears in a particular section.ae
If a plaintiff is defrauded in the sense that he sold stock which he would
not have sold had he known of certain material facts within the knowledge
of the defendants, and if the defendants bought and sold securities on the
basis of these facts, a cause of action is validly stated under 10b-5, whether
or not the plaintiff sold his stock directly or indirectly to the defendants, or
whether or not the defendants bought and sold securities on the open market
or among themselves. Rule 10b-5 covers fraud connected with the purchase
and sale of any security. It is not necessary for a violation of the Rule that
the defendants either buy or sell to the plaintiffs.
The Ferraioli decision has, in effect, determined that Rule 10b-5 is
broad enough to encompass the sale or purchase of securities by insiders
even when the selling and the buying takes place solely among the insiders
themselves. If the plaintiff is injured because he sold securities which he
otherwise would not have sold if he had known of the material facts known to
the insiders, then the plaintiff has a 10b-5 claim. However, the assessment of
the plaintiff's damages presents problems—for example, whether the plain-
tiff's damages are too speculative and whether any limitation should be placed
on the total amount of damages which all plaintiffs together can receive. 37
These two problems are closely related because a limitation on the total amount
of damages which the plaintiffs can receive will make it less objectionable to
grant speculative damages, since an upper limit may prevent clearly excessive
recovery.
The injury to the plaintiffs from the breach of the defendants' duty to
disclose is the loss of the opportunity to avail themselves of the premium which
the purchaser was willing to pay for a certain number of minority shares. This
loss is difficult to assess because of its conjectural nature; in effect, a determi-
nation must be made as to what might have been. It is by no means certain
that any particular plaintiff would have actually received a premium in the
sale of his stock."
If the defendants had fulfilled completely their duty to disclose, the
most the plaintiffs could possibly have received was the $3.50 premium on
35 It has been argued that the reference in § 10(b) to the "public interest"
implies that the section and the Rule are limited to the organized market. See 3 L. Loss,
supra note 15, at 1466.
38 Id. at 1467.
97 There is not an abundance of precedent with respect to the proper measure of
damages since a large percentage of the 101)-5 cases are settled out of court after a
summary judgment motion by the defendants is denied. See generally A. Bromberg,
supra note 21, §§ 9.1-.2; Comment, Remedies for Private Parties Under Rule 10b-5,
10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 337 (1969).
38 For a discussion of the evils of granting speculative recovery, see Comment,
supra note 37, at 343-44.
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each share sold. It is probable, however, that each plaintiff would have re-
,. ceived less, since with full disclosure of the availability of the premium more
stock might have been offered than the purchaser was willing to buy. In such a
situation, the purchaser probably would have bought pro rata from each
willing shareholder, bought on a first-come basis, or bought more shares than
originally intended at a lower premium. The total premium received by each
selling minority shareholder would be reduced if proportionate buying took
place or if the purchaser lowered the premium that he was willing to pay for
the individual shares of stock.
Even though the damages are extremely conjectural, the plaintiffs should
not be barred from any recovery because a limitation on the total amount of
damages can prevent injustice to the defendants. Two theories for the
limitation of damages are suggested by the facts of the Ferraioli case. First,
each plaintiff could be allowed to recover only the $3.50 premium on each
share sold during the period when disclosure should have been made. This
theory recognizes that it was the defendants' breach of duty which resulted
in damage to the plaintiffs in an undetermined amount, and since it was
the defendants' misconduct which caused the difficulty in assessment, each
plaintiff should be allowed to recover the full amount which he might have
received.
A second formula for damages is to .restrict the amount which all
plaintiffs receive to the total number of shares which the purchaser was
willing to buy multiplied by the $3.50 premium. This limitation of damages
recognizes the fact that the total amount which the plaintiffs could have
received had the defendants not breached their duty to disclose was limited by
the number of shares which the purchaser desired.
It is suggested that the second alternative for the limitation of damages
is the appropriate remedy in situations like Ferraioli. It is a definite and
practical measurement. The total amount recovered will not exceed that
amount which the associates received as a premium on the sale of their
shares and the premium received by the controlling shareholder will not be
attacked s9
 On the whole, a limitation on the plaintiffs' damages to an
amount equal to the number of shares which the purchaser was willing to
buy, multiplied by the $3.50 premium, complies as closely as possible with
the statutory demand that the plaintiffs' damages be limited to "actual
damages. 'NO
III. THE DUTY OF INVITATION
The opinion of the court in Ferraiali indicates that disclosure is not always
sufficient to avoid liability under I0b-5. If the controlling shareholder can
choose who is to receive a premium on the sale of stock, he must invite all
minority shareholders to participate in the premium sale if he invites any to
39 It is clear that the controlling stockholder has the right to receive a premium
in the sale of his personal holdings. For this reason, the plaintiffs must not be allowed
to attack directly the controlling shareholder's premium. See Essex Universal Corp. v.
Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962) ; H. Henn, supra note 18, at 384; Hill, The
Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986 (1957). •
40 See § 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1964),
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join.41
 The imposition of an affirmative duty to invite is apparently a unique
interpretation of 10b-5. It remains to be determined whether 10b-5 is the
proper vehicle for imposing such a duty.
The only ground on which the court could find a violation of 10b-5 in the
defendants' failure to invite all minority stockholders was a determination that
the defendants' actions worked a fraud on those not invited. Since the court
implies that the duty to invite would obtain even if full and complete dis-
closure were made, it is apparent that the court's conception of "fraud" in
this aspect of the Ferraioli case is unlike fraud in any ordinary sense. Al-
though proof of common law fraud is not necessary to establish a 10b-5
case,42 some type of false or misleading representation or non-disclosure is
necessary. 43 It is difficult to comprehend how a discriminatory invitation like
that in Ferraioli can be termed "fraud" even by the most liberal of definitions.
The invitation involved neither misrepresentation nor non-disclosure.
The defendants' actions could be called "manipulative"44 in the broad
sense that the non-invitation of the plaintiffs had a direct effect on the price
which the plaintiffs received for their stock. But this is an unsatisfactory
classification of the defendants' actions, since there are an infinite number of
factors which could affect the price that one receives for stock. Congress
obviously did not intend that any maneuver which affects the value of an-
other person's stock be classed as "manipulative" and therefore violative of
10b-5.45 Only those actions which involve some form of deception are within
the ambit of the Rule. Although the defendants' actions may be termed unfair,
undesirable and discriminatory, they do not constitute "fraud" or "ma-
nipulation" so as to be actionable under 10b-5.
The court in Ferraioli was apparently attempting to further the broad
congressional purpose of the securities laws, rather than trying to determine
whether the defendants actually violated the statute and the Rule as finally
enacted. In seeking to prevent undesirable discrimination, the court stretched
lOb-S too far and, as a result, the concept of "fraud" under the securities laws
has been distorted.
Even if it is assumed that the court was correct in its determination that
the defendants' non-invitation of the plaintiffs constituted a valid cause of action
under 10b-5, many of the same problems discussed above regarding the
41 See 281 F. Supp. at 357.
42 Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962). See 3 L.
Loss, supra note 15, at 1430-44.
43 Most courts and writers tacitly assume that the "fraud" of Rule 10b-5 necessarily
involves either misrepresentation or nondisclosure. See, e.g., 3 L. Loss, supra note 15, at
1764.
44 Section 10(b) itself forbids "manipulative" or "deceptive" devices. See note 5
supra.
45 In a somewhat different situation, one court has said that the purpose of 10b-5
was not to "establish a scheme of investors' insurance." List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965). But see A.T. Brod Sr Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397
(2d Cir. 1967), where the court states:
Nor do we think it sound to dismiss a complaint merely because the alleged
scheme does not involve the type of fraud that is "usually associated with the sale
or purchase of securities." We believe that 10(b) and Rule 1.01)-5 prohibit all
fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
751
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
defendants' breach of the duty to disclose are again apparent. Thus, it may
be questioned whether the plaintiffs bear the requisite relationship to the
defendants. If non-invitation does constitute fraud, however, the plaintiffs in
Ferraioli did bear a relationship to the defendants sufficient to maintain a 10b-5
claim. The plaintiffs fell within the broad words of the Rule itself," and recent
cases have hinted that one who has neither bought nor sold securities may
validly state a claim under 10b-5. 47 The plaintiffs in Ferraioli were sellers of
securities, and if a fraud was worked upon them, there is no reason why
they cannot bring a 10b-5 action.
In order to perfect his cause of action, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that he has suffered damage caused by the defendants' violation of the Rule.
Since the statute demands that plaintiffs' recovery be limited to "actual
loss,"" it is obvious that difficulties arise in measurement of the "actual loss"
of the plaintiffs in Ferraioli. In the non-invitation aspect of Ferraioli, it is a
little more definite that at least some of the plaintiffs would have joined on
the premium sale if the defendants had fulfilled their duty to invite all
minority shareholders to join. But again, it is impossible to determine which
plaintiffs would have joined, and whether pro rata sharing would have been
necessary. It is suggested, therefore, that the same measure of damages would
be appropriate in the non-invitation situation as was considered appropriate
in the non-disclosure aspect of the case. The plaintiffs, as a group, should
be allowed to recover only an amount equal to the total premium received
by the associates. This limitation on the plaintiffs' damages ensures that the
defendants will not be subject to an unfair or excessive recovery by the
plaintiffs."
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been argued that the court's decision that the defendants may
have violated 10b-5 by disclosing to only some of the minority shareholders
the fact of the availability of the premium is well grounded. However, it is
felt that a holding that a controlling shareholder may have violated the Rule
simply by failure to invite all minority shareholders when he invited some is ex-
cessive. These two aspects of the Ferraioli decision, the duty to disclose and
the duty to invite, are interrelated to some extent. The apparent imposition
of a duty to invite all minority shareholders to join in a premium sale of
stock when any are invited reinforces the duty to disclose, because it makes
the materiality of the availability of the premium more obvious. A reasonable
investor would definitely be influenced to act differently if he were informed
not only that a premium were available, but also that he had a right to
join in the premium. Both aspects of the opinion forward the "equal oppor-
tunity" theory by attempting to put all minority shareholders in the same
position with respect to an available premium.°
46 The
 plaintiffs were defrauded by "any person," "directly or indirectly," "in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security." See note 5 supra.
47 See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
48 See § 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bh (1964).
49 See text accompanying notes 37,40 supra.
88 The "equal opportunity" theory was first espoused in Andrews, The Stockholder's
Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1965). This
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Because the duty to disclose and the duty to invite are so closely in-
tertwined in Ferraioli, it could be argued that imposition of the duty to
invite is not a distortion of 10b-5, since the imposition of this duty is necessary
to realize the objectives for which the duty to disclose is imposed. However,
it is submitted that regardless of the close relationship between these two issues
of the Ferraioli case, the imposition of a duty to disclose is a valid interpreta-
tion of 10b-5, but that the imposition of a duty to invite is not. Full dis-
closure of all material facts is the object of 10b-5. A scheme to afford "equal
opportunity" for all in the sale of stock is an unwarranted extension of the
Rule. In no way may the non-invitation of the plaintiffs be termed "fraud."
Although it could be said that the imposition of a duty to invite is the only
means by which the availability of the premium can be made more material,
the fact remains that the availability of the premium is material information
standing alone and is therefore subject to disclosure rules without the duty
to invite all minority shareholders to join in the premium sale of stock. The
Ferraioli court was apparently trying to further a rule of "equal opportunity"
rather than attempting to interpret Rule 10b-5 as it presently operates.
The implications of the Ferraioli decision are important for the securi-
ties industry. As a result of the opinion, sales of large blocs of stock might
better be accomplished by one of three methods. First, and most probable, the
controlling shareholder in the sale of his controlling shares will not deal with
any of the minority. The controlling shareholder will inform prospective pur-
chasers that they must deal directly with the minority if they desire to buy
more shares than he has to sell. In this manner, the controlling shareholder
will not be under either a duty to disclose or to invite.
Second, it is possible that the controlling shareholder will Offer all minor-
ity shareholders the opportunity to participate pro rata in the premium sale
of any shares which are to be sold in excess of the controlling stockholder's
personal holdings. This alternative implies that the purchaser has told the
controlling shareholder that he is interested in purchasing additional shares.
According to Ferraioli, the controlling stockholder will be under a duty to
disclose to all minority stockholders the availability of the premium if he
tells any of the minority shareholders. If the purchaser requests the controlling
shareholder to find the additional shares, Ferraioli imposes on the controlling
shareholder a duty to invite all the minority shareholders to join in the pre-
mium if he invites even one.
Third, the sale of a large bloc of shares in a corporation may be ac-
complished through the use of the tender offer"- by which a prospective
purchaser indicates the number of shares he desires and the price he will
pay. All shareholders, including the controlling shareholder, are invited to
offer any shares which they wish to sell at that price.52 If more shares are offered
theory was immediately criticized by other commentators. See, e.g., Javaras, Equal
Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 420 (1965).
61 Cf. Andrews, supra note 50, at 516.
62 Unless the stockholder's holdings are included in the tender offer, this alternative
would be substantially the same as the first alternative discussed above where a general
offer was made for all shares in excess of those held by the controlling shareholder.
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than the purchaser is willing to buy, he may buy either pro rata or on a
first-come, first-served basis.
The implications of the Ferraioli decision concerning the imposition of a
duty to invite are especially important for owners of family corporations.
Often, the father owns the actual controlling shares of a corporation, while
his wife and children own certain of the minority shares and other minority
shares are widely held. If the father desires to sell out of the corporation, he
will face problems with respect to the sale of the stock owned by his wife
and children. If a purchaser is willing to buy more shares than those owned
by the father, the father must disclose this fact to all minority shareholders.
The father must also invite all minority shareholders to join in the premium
sale, if he invites his family. In effect, the father must either invite all to
share in the premium sale of stock, or sell his family's shares without the
premium. 53 Perhaps Ferraioli can be avoided if the controlling shareholder
purchases the shares held by his family. But it is unlikely that any such ob-
vious avoidance of Ferraioli's prohibitions will be permitted by the courts.
The Ferraioli decision offers a hint of further judicial development of
Rule 10b-5 liability. The court expressly left undecided the question whether
1 ob-5 is violated when a controlling shareholder sells his personal stock at a
premium without informing any of the minority shareholders. 54 The court did
decide that the change of control may become a material fact subject to the
disclosure rules when associates are invited to join in on the premium sale. 55
It is possible that in the future courts will find the fact of the change of con-
trol itself a material fact and will require disclosure at an early date.
The court's distortion of 10b-5 by the imposition of a duty to invite in
certain situations may lead to further unwarranted development of the Rule.
If a future court were to determine that the premium sale of controlling shares
is a material fact, even without disclosure to some minority shareholders, a
court might also feel that all minority shareholders should be invited to join
in the premium sale of the controlling shares. However, it is unlikely that
any court would stretch Rule 10b-5 farther than has Ferraioli with respect to
the imposition of an affirmative duty to invite.
FRANCES X. HOGAN
53 At common law, a father in a similar situation was allowed not only to sell his
family's shares at a premium, but also to suggest to the purchaser an appropriate price
for the minority's shares. See Tryon v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 229 P.2d 251 (1951).
64 See 281 F. Supp. at 357.
55 Id. at 356.
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